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Business group membership and IFRS reporting:  
The effect of group financing and investing incentives. 
 
Abstract 
Many unlisted firms are part of large conglomerate groups. For these firms, decisions about 
reporting practices are expected to be made at the group level (Beuselinck et al. 2014). Consistent 
with this hypothesis, our results indicate that group membership increases the likelihood of IFRS 
adoption by UK unlisted firms. Further, the identity and incentives of the parent firm are important 
determinants of the adoption decision. More specifically, our results suggest that subsidiaries adopt 
IFRS as part of their group’s strategy to improve the monitoring and optimise the financing and 
investing activities across the group, as portrayed by a subsequent increase in the investment 
efficiency at the subsidiary level and an increase in the probability of future debt issuance at the 
group level.  
Keywords: financial reporting; IFRS; business groups; unlisted firms; investment efficiency. 
JEL classification codes: F23; G11; M41. 
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1. Introduction 
The worldwide demand for the regulation of the reporting standards of unlisted companies 
(sometimes wrongly labelled SMEs) is once again at the top of the agenda for national and 
international regulators. In Europe, the mandating of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) for all listed companies within the EU has set off several initiatives to increase the 
accounting quality and comparability of unlisted firms (e.g.  EU directive 2013/34/EU; the 
issuance of FRS 101 and 102 in the UK). At the same time, the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) in the United States has commissioned the Private Company Council (PCC) to 
develop accounting standards meeting the special needs of US unlisted firms. Contrary to this 
trend, several regulators, managers, and investors have begun to challenge the widespread adoption 
of one set of rigorous accounting standards, particularly by SMEs and unlisted companies. For 
example, the European Financial Reporting EFRAG argues that “disclosure requirements must 
achieve the appropriate level of proportionality to the entity’s users’ need and meet a reasonable 
cost-benefit trade-off in all circumstances” (EFRAG 2012,  38). This implies that it might be 
optimal for firms to report under different regimes, tailored to the needs of their stakeholders and 
their available accounting resources. Accordingly, the new EU directive 2013/34/EU was 
developed with a “think small” focus and is an attempt to address this specific issue. 
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Indeed, the reporting needs of listed and unlisted companies can be very different. The FASB 
(2012) identifies the key characteristics of unlisted firms that differentiate their “financial reporting 
considerations” from those of their listed peers, as being the narrower scope of financial statement 
users and their easier access to management, the longer shareholders’ horizon, the different legal 
structures, the limited accounting resources, and the less timely update of their accounting teams. 
Yet, several unlisted firms have adopted the full set of IFRS voluntarily. Understanding why they 
do so and how they benefit from IFRS adoption is an interesting public policy issue. We explore 
the UK unlisted-firm setting, where many companies are required to provide financial statements 
and voluntary IFRS adoption is permitted for both consolidated and unconsolidated statements, to 
shed more light on this issue.  
Unlisted firms’ shareholder identity and needs are distinct and may well influence operational and 
reporting decisions. Some unlisted firms are controlled and run by individuals or families. In that 
case, the benefits of increased accounting quality are expected to be low (Ball and Shivakumar 
2005). However, many unlisted firms are subsidiaries of large conglomerate groups. For these 
firms, decisions about reporting practices are expected to be made at the group 1  level (see 
Beuselinck et al. 2014) and should be associated with group level characteristics and incentives. 
Even though prior literature has established that ownership characteristics play an important role 
                                                          
1
 Note that for the purposes of this study we use the terms “group” and “parent firm” interchangeably. 
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in firm’s accounting choices, to our knowledge, we are the first to directly examine group 
incentives per se. We argue that IFRS adoption by the group’s subsidiaries increases comparability 
among subsidiaries and lowers processing costs allowing for better monitoring by the parent firm 
and for more optimal capital allocation within the group. This in turn could enable the group to 
access cheaper external capital. Alternatively, subsidiaries might be instructed to adopt IFRS so as 
to facilitate portfolio restructuring at the group level, e.g., acquiring or selling subsidiaries in the 
near future. 
We start our empirical analysis by identifying a sample of IFRS adopting unlisted UK firms and a 
control sample of non-adopting unlisted UK firms. For the adopting sample, we hand collect 
information about the adoption date, as existing databases provide incomplete and in some cases 
inaccurate information. Employing both a discrete hazard model (Bassemir 2012) and a single 
period matched sample approach, we verify prior results that the decision to adopt IFRS is 
associated with the financial position and performance of the adopting firm. More specifically, we 
find that larger, more leveraged, younger firms, with low profitability and low tangibility, audited 
by a big 4 auditing firm are more likely to adopt IFRS.  
Next, we examine the effect of the shareholders’ identity and incentives on the IFRS adoption 
decision of an unlisted firm. Our results suggest that firms controlled by individual investors are 
less likely to adopt IFRS compared to firms that have dispersed ownership, a result that is 
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consistent with prior literature findings. However, firms belonging to a business group (i.e. 
controlled by a fund, another financial firm, or another non-financial firm) are the ones that are 
most likely to adopt. The probability of a subsidiary adopting IFRS increases further if the group 
is in need of additional external debt capital and/or favours optimisation of internal efficiency 
against portfolio restructuring. When controlling for both the group’s and the subsidiaries’ 
incentives, group incentives prevail and subsidiaries’ auditors, tangibility, leverage, or need for 
external capital do not appear to be significantly associated with the adoption of IFRS anymore. 
To finish, we explore whether adopting firms benefit themselves by the IFRS adoption in terms of 
improved investment efficiency. Our results indicate that only adopters that are members of a 
business group benefit from a decrease in underinvestment while other firms’ investment 
efficiency does not seem to be affected by their decision to adopt IFRS. 
Prior academic studies measuring the economic consequences of IFRS adoption for listed firms 
reach conflicting results. Some recent studies provide evidence of benefits in the form of increased 
investment efficiency, improved comparability and understanding by financial statement users, 
lower benefits from private information, lower cost of capital and higher liquidity (André et al. 
2014; Wu and Zhang 2010; Barth et al. 2012; Brochet et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2013; DeFond et al. 
2011). In contrast, other studies suggest that a mere switch to a common set of accounting 
standards does not bring about the anticipated improvement in earnings comparability and 
enhanced information quality (André et al. 2015, Beuselinck et al. 2007; Cascino and Gassen 2015; 
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Kvaal and Nobes 2010; Lang et al. 2010). Our study contributes to this stream of literature by 
providing an alternate benefit of international accounting standards, namely the improvement in 
the investing and financing activities at the business group level.  
In addition, we contribute to the growing stream of literature examining the relation between 
accounting reporting and firms’ investing strategies. Prior literature has established that accounting 
quality has a positive effect on firms’ investment efficiency (see for example, Biddle and Hilary 
2006; Bushman et al. 2011; and Chen et al. 2011). Chen et al. (2013) find that IFRS adoption, in 
particular, has increased investment efficiency through increased comparability with foreign peers; 
while Shroff et al. (2014) show that the quality of the external information environment of 
subsidiaries impacts on the parent firm’s investment efficiency. We extend their work to show that 
financing and investment incentives of the parent firm/group determine subsidiaries’ decision to 
adopt IFRS. 
 Lastly, we contribute to the debate about the appropriateness of IFRS, or any set of rigorous 
financial reporting standards for that matter, for unlisted firms. Our paper extends the relatively 
limited prior literature on the topic (Bassemir 2012; Francis et al. 2008) and provides important 
insights for accounting regulators. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our motivation and in doing 
so provide a brief review of the results of prior relevant studies. Section 3 describes the research 
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sample and data collection as well as the research model and variables. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results. Section 5 draws our conclusion. 
2. Literature review 
The IASB describes its mission as the development of accounting standards “that bring 
transparency, accountability and efficiency to financial markets around the world” (IFRS, 2017). 
Prior literature remains inconclusive about the extent to which mandatory IFRS adoption resulted 
in more comparable, higher quality financial statements in accordance with standard setters’ 
expectations. Many studies provide evidence that positive effects are at best confined to subgroups 
of IFRS adopters with certain characteristics (e.g. Bassemir and Novotny-Farkas 2015; Bonetti et 
al. 2016; Daske et al. 2013) or from certain jurisdictions (e.g. André et al. 2015; Bonetti et al. 2016; 
Cameran and Campa 2017;Christensen et al. 2013).  
Examining firms that voluntarily adopt IFRS has been, therefore, used by researchers to identify 
firms that expect economic benefits from adopting a rigorous, international set of accounting 
standards. Tarca (2004) using a sample of listed firms from the UK, France, Germany, Japan and 
Australia in 1999 and 2000, finds that firms that are larger, have more foreign revenue and are 
listed on one or more foreign stock exchanges are more likely to adopt international standards. In 
addition, her study reveals that the extent of firm attributes and the way standards are used vary 
between each of the five countries. In a similar study, Cuijpers and Buijink (2005) examine the 
7 
 
determinants of voluntary adoption of non-local GAAP for EU firms. They indicate that the 
percentage of adoption of non-local GAAP by EU firms in 1999 was relatively low, suggesting 
that only a minority of EU listed firms expect to benefit from non-local GAAP adoption. 
Furthermore, they find that voluntary adopters are of larger size, are more likely to be listed on a 
US exchange or the EASDAQ exchange, have more geographically dispersed operations, and are 
more likely to be domiciled in countries with lower quality financial reporting. Recognizing the 
role of country specific factors in determining voluntary adoption of international financial 
reporting standards, Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) investigate firm characteristics of voluntary IFRS 
adoption by German firms during the period from 1998 to 2004. They find that IFRS adopters are 
on average larger, younger, and with a higher proportion of foreign sales. They are also more likely 
to be cross-listed in the US and to have more dispersed ownership. 
However, most studies focus on listed firms. The amount of research work on international 
accounting standards adoption by unlisted firms is considerably less. Bassemir (2012) conducts 
empirical tests on 3,365 German private firms through 1998-2009, and finds that unlisted firms 
that decide to implement IFRS are more apt to be registered as Stock Corporation, are younger, 
with more growth opportunities, seek to raise external capital, have higher leverage ratios, have 
more international operations, are audited by large international firms, and are characterized by 
private equity involvement. On the other hand, Francis et al. (2008) investigate the role of the 
external environment on the decision of small and medium-sized unlisted firms to adopt IAS. They 
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find that firm factors appear to play a relatively more important role in more developed countries; 
while in less developed countries, country factors dominate firm factors in explaining IAS 
adoptions.   
The ownership structure of listed firms has been discussed and recognized as a factor in 
determining firms’ choice of accounting practices. Wu and Zhang (2009), using a large sample of 
Continental European firms from 1988 to 2004, show that less closely held firms have a higher 
probability of IFRS/ US GAAP adoption. They attribute this finding to the demand for better 
performance evaluation. In the same vein, Guenther et al. (2009) examine the impact of ownership 
structures on voluntary IFRS adoption in Germany. They find a negative influence of ownership 
concentration and bank ownership on voluntary IFRS adoption in Germany. These results are 
consistent with concentrated ownership structures in Germany facilitating communication 
between firms and investors via private information channels, thus rendering any benefit arising 
from IFRS adoption lower to the cost of implementation and transition. Further, banks appear to 
have superior access to company information (either through debt contracts or through their role 
as insiders) and a particular interest to maintain a creditor-orientated accounting system. 
Interestingly, Guenther et al. also find foreign ownership to be a delaying factor of IFRS adoption. 
Foreign owners are expected to prefer IFRS since the adoption of an internationally accepted set 
of accounting standards could reduce information processing costs and hence help reduce home 
bias. Their results can potentially be explained by the fact that foreign owners hold rather large 
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stakes in German firms and might therefore deem private communication channels as being more 
efficient. 
Particularly for unlisted firms, Bassemir (2012) argues that in terms of ownership structure, the 
key difference across unlisted firms arises from the type of the controlling owners rather than the 
degree of ownership concentration. He hypothesizes that incentives for voluntary IFRS adoption 
by unlisted equity backed firms may arise, because of either information asymmetries between 
managers and private equity sponsors, which create a demand for high quality financial reporting, 
or private equity investors’ (often from an Anglo-Saxon background) preference for accounting 
figures based on IFRS. 
Following Bassemir (2012), we differentiate firms based not only on ownership concentration 
level but also on the type of controlling shareholders. More specifically, we expect that individuals-
owners will not require IFRS adoption since they usually monitor managers closely (or even 
assume managerial positions themselves) minimizing potential agency costs and easing access to 
debt capital (Anderson et al. 2003). However, when controlling shareholders are other firms, we 
expect they would favour IFRS adoption by their subsidiaries to facilitate  future IPO/trade sales, 
increase transparency to optimise investment and financing decisions or minimize consolidating 
costs. For our empirical tests, we further differentiate between controlling shareholders that are 
non-financial firms, financial firms, and funds. 
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Next, we turn to examining how specific controlling firms’ incentives can affect IFRS adoption 
by their subsidiaries. Prior literature has shown that internal capital markets within organisations 
have the potential to add value by more efficiently allocating capital to projects/divisions compared 
to outside capital providers and by alleviating financial constraints of smaller, stand-alone entities 
(Stein 1997). At the same time, however, organisational complexity can cause increased agency 
costs and decreased monitoring ability by the parent firm. Results in Doukas and Pantzalis (2003) 
suggest that the lower level of long-term debt in multinational firms is due to higher agency costs 
rather than better internal capital markets. In addition, Shin and Kim’s (2002) find evidence 
consistent with division managers making sub-optimal investment decisions so as to maximize the 
use of the allocated budget; while Dellestrand and Kappen (2012) provide evidence of parent firms 
making resource allocation decisions based on geographic, cultural, linguistic and institutional 
distance of the subsidiary. 
At the firm level, better accounting information has been shown to be associated with lower cost 
of capital. Sengupta (1998) finds that firms evaluated by analysts as high disclosure quality firms 
enjoy a lower cost of financing. Bharath et al. (2008) show that accounting quality not only affects 
the cost of financing, but also determines the terms of private debt contracts. Particularly about 
IFRS, Florou and Kosi (2015) find that their adoption is associated with an increase in public 
borrowing and a decrease in the cost of debt, especially in countries where local GAAP used to be 
considerable different to IFRS. Increased accounting quality, further, has the potential to help firms 
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get closer to their theoretical optimal investment level by minimizing adverse selection and moral 
hazard concerns. Indeed, prior literature provides evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Biddle 
and Hilary (2006) and Bushman et al. (2011) find that accounting quality, measured by earning 
aggressiveness, earning smoothing, timeliness or the existence of small negative earnings, 
decreases investment-cash flow sensitivity. Chen et al. (2013) use the difference between ROA 
reported by a firm and that of its peers as a measure of investment efficiency that is informative to 
the company as well as to investors. They provide evidence that this difference is predictive of 
future investment and that the relation gets stronger after the introduction of IFRS. Particularly for 
unlisted firms, Chen et al. (2011) using World Bank data for firms in emerging markets show that 
reporting quality decreases investment inefficiencies especially for firm with high bank financing 
and low tax incentives.  
Increased information at the firm/subsidiary level, on top of the published consolidated statements, 
can also reduce the level of information asymmetry surrounding the group and mitigate agency 
costs. Beaver et al. (2015) find that subsidiary level information has incremental value for 
predicting bankruptcy over and above consolidated financial statements. Consistent with Beaver 
et al. (2015), Shroff et al. (2014) show that external information environment quality at the 
country-industry level of a group’s subsidiaries affect investment efficiency of the parent 
company, particularly so when cross-border frictions are high and parent companies are more 
invested in the subsidiaries. In this study, we extend Shroff et al. (2014) by examining how the 
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group’s financing and portfolio restructuring needs affect the IFRS adoption decision and the 
investment efficiency of their subsidiaries. 
3.  Research design 
Research sample and data collection 
We use the FAME database provided by Bureau van Dijk (BvD) to select our sample of UK 
unlisted firms and to collect relevant financial data. We start by downloading information for all 
unlisted UK firms followed by FAME which are registered as either “Private Limited” or “Public, 
Not Quoted” firms with non-missing total asset and turnover information for at least one year 
between 2004-2014. Our initial search yields more than 720,000 unique firms. Fame information 
on adopted reporting standards prior to 2008 is limited and sometimes inaccurate. Therefore, to 
determine our IFRS adopters sample, we start by identifying 6,916 firms that are coded as having 
applied IFRS at some point between 2005 and 2012. 2 Next, we hand-collect information on IFRS 
adoption year for these firms. Of the 6,916 firms 285 appear to have never adopted IFRS or were 
listed at the time of first adoption. Another 1,389 firms are dropped because they adopted IFRS in 
the first year of operations and for our analysis we need one-year-lagged data. This leaves us with 
5,242 IFRS adopters. To restrict the outsized pool of our potential control sample of non IFRS 
                                                          
2
 The reason we restrict our sample to 2012 is that in November 2012 the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 
published FRS 101, a revised financial reporting framework largely based on IFRS which would become mandatory 
in January 2015 but firms could voluntary adopt it as early as 2013.   
13 
 
adopters, we match, separately for every year, each of our 5,242 adopters with a maximum of 3 
non-adopting firms. Our matching is based on industry membership, fiscal year, and total assets. 
Finally, deleting observations for which we did not have all financial data required for our analysis, 
reduces our final sample to 3,506 adopters and 8,296 non adopters. 
For the group level analysis, we collect parent identity information from FAME, and all parent 
financial information data from the Orbis database which is also provided by BvD. After deleting 
observations with missing values for one or more of our control variables we end up with a sample 
of 5,249 unique non-individuals controlling parents, corresponding to 21,479 firm-year 
observations for our group level regressions. To construct our portfolio restructuring variables and 
to convert Orbis static number of subsidiaries variable to a time series one we collect merger and 
acquisition data from Zephyr, another BvD database. 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our treatment and control groups of unlisted UK firms, as 
well as univariate comparison results. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% both sides. 
IFRS adopters are on average larger in size, which is consistent with IFRS adoption being 
expensive and thus less appealing to smaller firms with restricted resources. At the same time 
adopting firms appear to be younger, less profitable, with higher leverage and less fixed tangible 
assets, consistent with investors’ demand for transparency being higher for those firms. Apart from 
higher current leverage, IFRS adopters issue both more equity and more debt in the year following 
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the adoption compared to the control group.  On the other hand, there is no unconditional difference 
between the treatment and control groups with respect to the identity of their auditor as in both 
subsample approximately 54% of firms are audited by a big 4 auditing firm.  
With regards to the identity of controlling shareholders, IFRS adopters are more likely to be 
controlled by financial firms and less likely to be controlled by individuals; while there is no 
unconditional difference between firms controlled by funds or non-financial firms. Parent firms 
requiring IFRS adoption by their subsidiaries are more likely to report under IFRS themselves. 
However, note that only 46% of adopting subsidiaries belong to an IFRS reporting parent, while 
22% of the non-adopting firms are controlled by IFRS parents. The groups/parent firms of the 
IFRS adopting subsidiaries appear to differ in several other characteristics as well. Specifically, 
subsidiary firms appear to be more likely to adopt IFRS if they belong in a more complex group 
(in terms of number of members), and if they share the same industry membership and/or name 
with their parent firm. Surprisingly, according to table 1, IFRS adopting subsidiaries are more 
likely to be member of a UK group despite the UK groups’ familiarity with the local accounting 
standards and the geographical proximity to the subsidiary. In addition, just like their UK unlisted 
subsidiaries parent firms of IFRS adopters are larger, less profitable, with higher need for capital 
and lower asset tangibility. Lastly, parents of IFRS subsidiaries appear to be more active in the 
M&A scene as acquirers and less active as vendors. 
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[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 presents the geographic breakdown of the parent firms. The parent firms are 
predominantly from the UK while the second largest geographic area represented in the sample 
is the EU, followed by Asia. Table 3 presents a breakdown of our total and treatment sample by 
fiscal year. Of our 3,506 IFRS adopters 35% adopted IFRS on the first instance they were 
allowed to in 2005. Another 15% adopted in 2006, while the number of new adopters dropped 
significantly in 2012, most likely due to the issuance of FRS 101 & 102. The fiscal year 
distribution of IFRS adoption by subsidiary firms is smoother but the 2012 drop is also observed 
in this sample.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Econometric approach 
Firm level adoption incentives 
We start our analysis by replicating prior studies exploring firm level incentives to adopt IFRS. 
Following Bassemir (2012), we run a discrete-time hazard model where IFRS adopters appear for 
multiple years up to (and inclusive of) the adoption year, coded as non-IFRS firms for all years 
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except for the adoption year. IFRS adopters are dropped from the sample after the adoption year. 
In that way, we explicitly account for time-dependencies of the IFRS adoption decision. For 
consistency with the rest of the literature, we also employ a single-period logit model where every 
adopting firm appears once, in the year of adoption, and is matched with non-adopting firms based 
on industry membership, fiscal year and total assets. In both cases, our analysis includes 
documented financial reporting determinants as follows: 
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where IFRSi,t is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if firm i has adopted IFRS in that specific 
year and zero otherwise. Assetsi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of total assets in year t-1; Levi,t is the 
ratio of total, long- and short-term, debt over total assets for firm i in year t-1; Profiti,t-1 is the ratio 
of operating income over total assets at t-1; Tangi,t-1 is total fixed assets over total assets at t-1; 
Agei,t-1 is the number of years from the foundation of the company to the beginning of the fiscal 
year; and Big4i,t-1 is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the financial statements of the 
firm in year t-1 were audited by a Big4 audit firm and zero otherwise. ContIndi,t, ContFini,t, 
ContFundi,t, ContNonFini,t are all binary variables taking the value of 1 if the firm is controlled by 
a group of individuals, a financial firm excluding funds, a fund, and a non-financial firm 
respectively, and the value of zero otherwise. 
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Based on the results of prior literature, we expect a positive relation between IFRS adoption and 
the size of the firm. Large firms are more likely to have the necessary accounting and financial 
recourses to implement IFRS, they are also more likely to engage in international activities, and 
are faced with higher political costs. (Dumontier and Raffournier 1998; Tarca 2004; Cuijpers and 
Buijink 2005; Gassen and Sellhorn 2006).  
We expect that younger firms which are faced with higher adverse selection issues, and firms 
audited by large and international audit firms, considered to have a comparative advantage in 
auditing IFRS, are more likely to adopt IFRS (Bassemir 2012). 
We predict a negative association between capital intensity and voluntary IFRS adoption by 
unlisted firms based on the argument that when the firm’s capital is invested mainly in fixed assets, 
the need for transparency and monitoring should be less than for those with a high proportion of 
current and/or intangible assets (Dumontier and Raffournier 1998). 
Prior research on voluntary IFRS adoption presents mixed arguments and evidence regarding the 
role of leverage and profitability in affecting firms’ international accounting standards choices 
(Bassemir 2012; Dumontier and Raffournier 1998; El-Gazzar et al. 1999, Murphy 1999, Tarca 
2004, Wu and Zhang 2009). For that reason, we have no a priori expectations about their effects 
on the IFRS adoption decision. 
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Following Bassemir (2012) we also examine how the type of ownership affects the adoption 
decision along with the level of ownership concentration. However, unlike Bassemir (2012) who 
categorises firms based on whether they are controlled by a private equity fund or not, we 
differentiate between non-controlled firms, firms controlled by a group of individuals, firms 
controlled by a non-financial firm, firms controlled by funds, and firms controlled by another 
financial firm. We expect that firms controlled by individuals are less likely to adopt IFRS as 
controlling individuals tend to have strong personal ties with the firms; but we expect that firms 
controlled by other firms are at least as likely to adopt IFRS as firms with disperse ownership. 
Group level adoption incentives 
Our analysis focuses next on how the characteristics and incentives of the controlling business 
group can determine the “voluntary” adoption of IFRS by their unlisted subsidiaries. For this part 
of our analysis, therefore, we drop unlisted firms with disperse ownership and firms controlled by 
individual investors. We argue that plans for capital increases and portfolio restructuring at the 
group level could play a key role in the group’s decision to require IFRS adoption by its 
subsidiaries along with the degree of information asymmetry between the parent firm and the 
subsidiary and the group’s other characteristics. Accordingly, we employ the following discrete 
time hazard model to test our hypothesis: 
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The dependent variable, just like in regression (1), is a dummy variable taking the value of one if 
the subsidiary i has adopted IFRS in year t. GRPInci,t+2 represents group level incentives, our main 
variables of interest. To capture the need for additional capital, we identify firms that increased 
their debt by more than 10% or firms that had an IPO and/or increased their equity capital by more 
than 10% in the 24 months following the year end. We use the selling and acquisition of 
subsidiaries by the parent and the buy-out of the parent itself as proxies for portfolio restructuring. 
GRPIFRSi,t is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the group’s consolidated financial 
statements are prepared under IFRS; GRPUKi,t is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the 
parent firm of i is also based in the UK; GRPIndi,t is a dummy variable taking the value of one if 
the subsidiary and the parent company belong to the same industry as captured by the two digit 
NAICS 2012 code; GRPNamei,t is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the subsidiary is 
named after the parent firm, GRPComplexi,t is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the 
group has more than the median number of subsidiaries; and all other variables are as previously 
defined only measured at the level of the group rather than the individual subsidiary. 
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Consistent with prior literature focusing at the firm level, we expect that subsidiaries of groups in 
need of additional capital (equity or debt) are more likely to adopt IFRS to decrease the group’s 
cost of capital. We make no specific predictions about how group’s plans for portfolio restructuring 
affects the probability of IFRS adoption by its subsidiaries, as to our knowledge we are the first to 
examine this issue. On one hand, IFRS adoption by subsidiaries could be instructed to increase the 
probability of future sales of the group’s subsidiaries or of the group itself and the expansion of 
the group through the acquisition of new subsidiaries. On the other hand, IFRS adoption could be 
required for internal re-organisation purposes, for example to improve capital allocation decisions 
within the group.  
In our analysis, we control for the level of information asymmetry and the importance of the 
subsidiary within the group. We expect that when parents are located outside the U.K. and control 
a large number of firms, they are more likely to require IFRS adoption by their subsidiaries, as 
close monitoring of each group member is more difficult in those cases. We also expect that 
subsidiaries are more likely to adopt IFRS when they share the same name and operate in the same 
industry as their parent firm, in other words when they are important for the parent firm and the 
group. Further, we argue that parents that adopt IFRS themselves are more likely to have 
subsidiaries that also apply IFRS, as on top of any benefits from increased accounting 
comparability among existing and potential subsidiaries, the group also benefits from lower 
processing and consolidation costs in that case. Lastly, we expect subsidiaries of large, younger 
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groups with low tangibility to have higher probability of adopting IFRS, consistently with firm 
level results in prior literature.     
IFRS adoption and firm level investment efficiency 
Our last analysis examines whether the adoption of IFRS by the unlisted subsidiary has real 
economic consequences for the adopting firms itself. In particular, we study whether following the 
adoption of IFRS, unlisted subsidiaries invest more efficiently. Prior literature measures 
investment efficiency mainly in two ways, based on the sensitivity of the investment level to 
growth opportunities captured by Tobin’s q or based on the residuals of a regression where 
investment level is regressed against factors known to affect it. Due to the lack of market data we 
opted for the second option which has been used extensively in the accounting literature (e.g. 
Biddle et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2011). Following Chen et al. (2011), we measure investment 
efficiency as the residual error from a regression model that conditions the level of investment on 
changes in firms’ revenues/turnover, it being a proxy for growth opportunities. More specifically, 
we run the following OLS regression, separately for each 2-digit UK SIC code: 
tii1ti,ti1ti,titi yearRevGrNegRevGrNegInvest ,,321,10, εαααα ++×+++= ∑−−−             (3) 
We measure the level of investment (Investi,t) as the change in the gross value of property, plant, 
and equipment (PPE) scaled by total assets. Negi,t-1 is a binary variable taking the value of one if 
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revenues in year t-1 declined compared to the previous year; and RevGri,t-1 is the percentage change 
in firm’s i revenues in year t-1.  
The residual (εi,t) is our measure of abnormal investment or investment (in)efficiency. The higher 
εi,t is in absolute terms, the higher the distance between the average conditional investment of firms 
in the same industry and the investment of the firm, therefore the higher the abnormal investment. 
For our analysis, we distinguish between positive (overinvestment) and negative 
(underinvestment) residual values as they are associated with different types of market 
inefficiencies. Overinvestment is usually associated with moral hazard and management empire-
building; while underinvestment is associated with adverse selection and restricted access to 
capital.  
Next, we regress the residuals from the previous stage on our IFRS variable and a group of other 
control variables expected to affect firm investment efficiency (Chen et al. 2011). Given the 
significance of the owner identity showcased in our earlier results, we run the analysis separately 
for firms - members of larger business groups and firms with dispersed ownership or controlled 
by individuals: 
∑ +++
++++++=
−−−
−−−−−
tiitititi
titititititi
firmCashLiqBigAge
 TangProfitLevAssetsIFRSAbIn
,1,71,71,6
1,51,41,31,21,10,
4                
 
εααα
αααααα
     (4) 
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AbInvi,t is the absolute residual term calculated based on regression (3). CashLiqi,t-1 is the ratio of 
cash and cash equivalent over the total asset of firm i in year t-1; and all other variables are as 
previously defined measured at the firm level. 
4. Empirical results 
IFRS adoption incentives 
Table 4 presents results of our regression analysis of IFRS adoption determinants. Following prior 
literature, we start by identifying determinants at the firm level. The first two columns of the table 
present the results of our discrete time hazard model. The size of the firms is positively associated 
with IFRS adoption, which is consistent with prior literature results and our hypothesis of higher 
political pressure and lower relative costs of IFRS adoption for large firms. Highly profitable firms, 
on the other hand, appear to be less likely to adopt IFRS, suggesting that demand for accounting 
transparency is lower for those “safer” firms. By the same token, younger firms surrounded by 
high information asymmetry are more likely to adopt IFRS. Audit by a big 4 accounting is 
positively associated with IFRS adoption, a finding which is consistent with big 4 being more 
experienced with international accounting standards and with firms employing a big 4 company 
being on average more transparent. Prior studies are inconclusive on the role of leverage on the 
decision to adopt IFRS. In our sample we find a strong positive association between leverage and 
IFRS adoption, which implies that debtors have a preference for IFRS. In the second column of 
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Table 4 we further control for future increases in equity and debt. Potential future equity- and debt-
holders also appear to have a preference for IFRS as implied by a strongly significant positive 
coefficient for both variables. 
As a robustness test, columns three and four repeat the same analysis but employ a single-period 
model where each adopting firm is included in the sample once, at the time of adoption, and is 
matched with a maximum of three non-adopting firms based on its industry membership (two digit 
UK SIC code), the year of adoption, and the level of its assets. The results are rather consistent 
with the ones reported in columns one and two with the exception of the tangibility which now 
appears to be significantly negatively associated with IFRS adoption, as predicted. 
The last two columns of Table 4 introduce our ownership variables. Most prior literature argues 
that firms with disperse ownership are more likely to adopt IFRS. However, these papers treat all 
controlling owners the same despite potential significant differences between individual 
blockholders (e.g. founding families) and other corporate entities investing in equity. On the other 
hand, Bassemir (2012) focuses on firms controlled by equity funds and treat all other firms as one 
homogenous group. We extend this stream of literature by distinguishing between the different 
types of ownership and find that although firms controlled by a group of individuals are indeed 
less likely to adopt IFRS compared to firms with disperse ownership, firms that form part of bigger 
business groups and are owned either by a non-financial firm, a fund or other types of financial 
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firms are more likely to adopt IFRS.  Note that including controls for the type of controlling 
shareholders does not affect our prior conclusions about how the financial position, performance, 
and capital needs of firms affect their decision to adopt IFRS. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Our main hypothesis states that firms are sometimes choosing their reporting strategy to satisfy 
the incentives and needs of the business group they belong to, rather than their own (Beuselinck 
et al. 2014). This hypothesis is investigated in Table 5. More specifically, we examine whether 
IFRS adoption is associated with new capital issuance and portfolio restructuring at the group 
level. In column one of Table 5 – Panel A we focus on the groups’ need for external capital. The 
reported results suggest that subsidiaries are more likely to adopt IFRS if their parent firms are 
planning to issue more debt in the near future. At the same time, plans for future equity issuance 
at the group level do not appear to be related to subsidiaries’ decision to adopt IFRS. Column two 
of Table 5 presents our test of how groups’ portfolio restructuring incentives can influence IFRS 
adoption of their subsidiaries. We find a significant negative coefficient for all our portfolio 
restructuring variables, indicating that formed groups that do not plan future selling or acquisition 
of subsidiaries and groups that want to avoid future disciplinary take-overs are more likely to 
request their subsidiaries to adopt IFRS. In column three we control for both types of incentives 
and our results remain qualitatively the same. Based on this evidence, we argue that IFRS adoption 
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at the subsidiary level is required for improving internal allocation of capital and the group’s 
investment decisions with the ultimate aim of facilitating access to the debt market. The first part 
of this argument is further investigated in subsection 4.2. 
In Table 5, we also control for other characteristics of the parent firm/group that could affect 
subsidiaries’ decision to adopt IFRS. To start with, we control for IFRS adoption by the parent 
firm. As expected, if the parent firm is applying IFRS the probability that its subsidiary will also 
adopt IFRS increases, as in this case benefits for the group are expected to be higher. On the other 
hand, when the parent firm is a UK firm itself, the probability of IFRS adoption by a UK subsidiary 
decreases, potentially due to the parents’ familiarity with UK GAAP and the geographically 
proximity between the parent and the subsidiary which allows for more close monitoring. Results 
in Table 5 – Panel A also indicate that the probability of IFRS adoption by a subsidiary increases 
with the importance of the subsidiary in the group and with the information asymmetry 
surrounding the group. Namely, we find that the subsidiaries that share the same name and operate 
in the same industry as the parent firm are more likely to adopt IFRS. The probability of IFRS 
adoption by a subsidiary also increases with the number of firms in the group and the group’s 
leverage level, but decreases with the parent’s age and the group level of tangibility and 
profitability. 
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In Panel B of Table 5 we simultaneously control for group and subsidiary level incentives. As can 
be seen, future debt issuance at the group level remains positive and statistically significant and all 
group level portfolio restructuring variables remain significantly negatively associated with 
subsidiary level IFRS adoption. With regards to subsidiary incentives, while the relative size of 
the subsidiary, its profitability, and its age appear to still be statistically significant determinants 
of IFRS adoption, subsidiary’s tangibility, leverage, and auditors appear to have no impact once 
group level incentives are taken into account. Untabulated analysis reveals that when controlling, 
in addition, for future equity and debt issuance at the subsidiary level these are not statistically 
significant; our big 4 auditor dummy, however, becomes significantly negative in that case.  
Our analysis presented in Table 5 – Panel B includes further controls which are not reported for 
presentational reasons. In particular, we control for IFRS application by the parent firm itself, for 
the parent being a UK based firm, operating in the same industry and sharing the same name with 
the subsidiary, for the group complexity in terms of the number of subsidiaries, and the parent 
firm’s age as in Panel A. Coefficients are consistent with those presented in Panel A with the 
exception of parent’s age and location that now become statistically insignificant. 
To avoid multicolinearity, in Table 5 – Panel B we do not control for the group’s total assets, 
profitability, tangibility, and leverage as these are basically a sum of the corresponding amounts 
for all subsidiaries and the parent firm. When added, these variables do not significantly alter our 
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results. The only change is that firm level profitability becomes statistically insignificant as an 
IFRS adoption determinant.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Firm level investment efficiency 
As a final step, we test whether IFRS adopting subsidiaries enjoy a more efficient investment 
strategy avoiding both underinvestment problems from limited access to capital as well as 
overinvestment due to moral hazard issues. Given the influence of the owners’ identity established 
in our previous analysis, we distinguish between firms controlled by another corporation and firms 
with disperse ownership or individual investors. We further distinguish between firms that suffer 
from underinvestment and overinvestment problems. Underinvestment is mostly linked to firms’ 
access to capital and adverse selection issues. As shown in Table 5, IFRS adoption decreases 
underinvestment but only for adopting firms that are members of a larger business group. IFRS 
adopters with disperse ownership or firms controlled by individual investors, on the other hand, 
does not appear to benefit from IFRS in such a way. Overinvestment problems typically stem from 
managerial agency costs such as empire building and overconfidence. IFRS adoption does not 
appear to either increase or decrease overinvestment for any of our two subgroups.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
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5. Conclusions 
This study is motivated by the continued debate on the costs and benefits of adopting IFRS and 
the debate on what standards are more appropriate for unlisted firms. Proponents of IFRS claim 
that IFRS increases financial comparability and usefulness of accounting information. However, 
others believe worldwide adoption of IFRS by all firms is costly, complex and does not necessarily 
improve the quality of accounting reports. As such, it is interesting to examine firms which are not 
obliged to use IFRS but voluntarily choose to report using IFRS. Given that firms are making 
rational decisions, presumably through weighing benefits and costs, voluntary adopters must have 
reasons and incentives to incur the adoption/switching costs and likely expect benefits. This study 
provides evidence of the kind of firms for whom the benefits of adopting IFRS may outweigh the 
costs by focusing on their ownership structure. 
Even though prior literature has established that ownership characteristics play an important role 
in firms’ accounting choices, to our knowledge we are the first to examine how financing and 
portfolio restructuring concerns of a business group can affect the decision of its subsidiaries to 
adopt IFRS. More specifically, we argue that increased comparability among subsidiaries and 
lower processing costs allow for better monitoring by the parent firm and for more optimal capital 
allocation both within and outside the group. Consistent with this argument, we find that the capital 
needs and the investment strategy of the group are more important determinants of a subsidiary’s 
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decision to adopt IFRS than the characteristic/incentives of the subsidiary itself. Our results 
suggest that subsidiaries are required to adopt IFRS to ease group’s access to external debt capital 
and for internal development purposes (groups whose subsidiaries adopt IFRS are less likely to be 
involved in future M&A transactions either as acquirers, vendors, or targets). Our results, further, 
indicate that adopters that are members of a business group benefit from a decrease in 
underinvestment after the IFRS adoption, while this is not true for IFRS adopters with dispersed 
ownership or IFRS adopters controlled by individual investors.  
Academic research on financial reporting choices by unlisted firms is scarce, which may be 
attributed to the fact that without public disclosure requirements, financial data and accounting 
practices for unlisted firms are not often readily available. Research on accounting practices of 
unlisted firms is, nonetheless, of great interest. Unlisted firms make up the majority of all firms in 
the world and IFRS adoption for unlisted firms has been hot topic debated among policy makers 
and standard setters in recent years. This paper is one of relatively few examining voluntary IFRS 
adoption by unlisted firms, and thus, provides interesting empirical evidence to standard setters by 
indicating the type of unlisted firms which may prefer to use and benefit from IFRS. This paper is 
also the first to examine how the financing and investing strategies of the business group affect the 
adoption of IFRS by subsidiary firms, suggesting that economic consequences of IFRS adoption 
go beyond the adopting firm itself. 
31 
 
REFERENCES 
Anderson, R.C., Mansi, S.A., and Reeb, D.M. 2003. Founding family ownership and the agency 
cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics 68 (2): 263-285. 
André, P., Filip, A., & Marmousez, S. 2014. L'impact des normes IFRS sur la relation entre le 
conservatisme et l'efficacité des politiques d'investissement. The impact of IFRS on the 
relationship between conservatism and investment efficiency. Comptabilité Contrôle Audit 20 
(3): 101-124 
André, P., Filip, A., & Paugam, L. 2015. The Effect of Mandatory IFRS Adoption on 
Conditional Conservatism in Europe. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 42: 482-514.  
Ball R., and Shivakumar, L. 2005. Earnings quality in UK private firms: comparative loss 
recognition timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39 (1):  83-128. 
Barth, M.E., Landsman, W.R., Lang, M., and Williams, C. 2012. Are IFRS-based and US 
GAAP-based accounting amounts comparable? Journal of Accounting and Economics 54 (1), 
68-93. 
Bassemir, M. 2012. Why do private firms adopt IFRS? Available at SSRN. 
Bassemir, M., and Novotny-Farkas, Z. 2015. IFRS adoption, Reporting Incentives, and Financial 
Quality in Private Firms. Available at SSRN. 
Beaver, W.H., Cascino, S., Correia, M.M., and McNichols, M.F. 2016. Bankruptcy in Groups. 
Available at SSRN. 
Beuselinck, C., Cascino, S., Deloof, M., and Vanstraelen, A. 2016 Earnings Management within 
Multinational Corporations. Available at SSRN. 
Beuselinck, C., Joos, P., and Van der Meulen, S. 2007. International Earnings Comparability. 
Available at SSRN. 
Bharath S.T., Sunder, J., and Sunder, S.V. 2008. Accounting Quality and Debt Contracting. The 
Accounting Review 83 (1): 1-28. 
Biddle, G.C., and Hilary, G. 2006. Accounting Quality and Firm Level Capital Investment. The 
Accounting Review 81 (5): 963-982. 
Biddle, G.C., Hilary, G., and Verdi, R.S. 2009. How does financial reporting quality relate to 
investment efficiency? Journal of Accounting and Economics 48 (2–3): 112-131. 
32 
 
Bonetti, P.,  Magnan, M.L., and Parbonetti, A. 2016 The Influence of Country- and Firm-level 
Governance on Financial Reporting Quality: Revisiting the Evidence. Journal of Business Finance 
& Accounting 43 (9-10): 1059-1094. 
Brochet, F., Jagolinzer, A.D., and Riedl, E.J. 2013. Mandatory IFRS adoption and Financial 
Statement Comparability. Contemporary Accounting Research 30 (4): 1373-1400. 
Bushman, R.M., Piotroski, J.D., and Smith, A.J. 2011. Capital Allocation and Timely Accounting 
Recognition of Economic Losses. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 38 (1-2): 1-33. 
Cameran, M., and Campa, D. 2017. Voluntary IFRS Adoption and Earnings Quality Among 
Unilited Firms in the EU: The Relevance of Countries’ Institutional Setting and Firms’ 
Reporting Incentives. Available at SSRN. 
Cascino, S., and Gassen, J. 2015. What drives the comparability effect of mandatory IFRS 
adoption? Review of Accounting Studies 20 (1): 242-282. 
Chen, F., Hope O-K., Li, Q., and Wang, X. 2011. Financial Reporting Quality and Investment 
Efficiency of Private Firms in Emerging Markets. The Accounting Review, 86 (4): 1255-1288. 
Chen, T-Y., Chin, C., Wang, S., and Yao, C. 2013. The Effect of Mandatory IFRS Adoption on 
Bank Loan Contracting. Available at SSRN. 
Christensen, H. B., L. Hail, C. Leuz 2013, ‘Mandatory IFRS Reporting and Change in 
Enforcement’, Journal of Accounting and Economics 56 (2–3): 144–77. 
Cuijpers, R., and Buijink, W. 2005. Voluntary adoption of non-local GAAP in the European union: 
A study of determinants and consequences. European Accounting Review 14: 487-524. 
Daske, H., Hail L., Leuz, C. and Verdi, R. 2013, ‘Adopting a Label: Heterogeneity in the Economic 
Consequences of IFRS Adoptions’, Journal of Accounting Research 51 (3); 495–547. 
DeFond, M., Hu, X., Hung, M., and Li, S. 2011. The impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on 
foreign mutual fund ownership: The role of comparability. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 51 (3): 240-258. 
Dellestrand, H., and Kappen, P. 2012. The effects of spatial and contextual factors on headquarters 
resource allocation to MNE subsidiaries. Journal of International Business and Studies 43: 219-
243. 
Doukas, J.A., and Pantzalis, C. 2003. Geographic diversification and agency costs of debt of 
multinational firms. Journal of Corporate Finance 9: 59-92. 
33 
 
Dumontier, P., and Raffournier, B. 1998. Why firms comply voluntarily with IAS: An empirical 
analysis with Swiss data. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting 9; 216-
245. 
El-Gazzar, S.M., Finn, P.M., and Jacob, R. 1999. An empirical investigation of multinational firms' 
compliance with international accounting standards. The International Journal of Accounting 34; 
239-248. 
European Financial Reporting Advisory Group, 2012. Towards a Disclosure Framework for the 
Notes – Discussion Paper. Belgium: European Financial Reporting Advisory Group. 
Florou A., and Kosi, U. 2015. Does mandatory IFRS adoption facilitate debt financing? Rev 
Account Stud 204: 1407-1456. 
Francis, J.R., Khurana, I.K.,  Martin, X., and Pereira, R. 2008. The role of firm-specific incentives 
and country factors in explaining voluntary IAS adoptions: Evidence from private firms. European 
Accounting Review 17: 331-360. 
Franks, J.,  and Sussman, O. 2005. Financial Distress and Bank Restructuring of Small to Medium 
Size UK Firms. Review of Finance 9 (1): 65-96. 
Gassen, J., and Thorsten S. 2006. Applying IFRS in Germany: Determinants and consequences. 
Available at SSRN. 
Gibbs, P.A. 1993. Determinants of corporate restructuring: the relative importance of corporate 
governance, takeover threat, and free cash flow. Strategic Management Journal 14: 51-68. 
Güenther, N., Gegenfurtner, B., Kaserer, C., and Achleitner, A-K. 2009. International financial 
reporting standards and earnings quality: The myth of voluntary vs. mandatory adoption. Available 
at SSRN. 
International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation, 2017. Mission Statement.[online] 
Available at:<http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/Pages/IFRS-Foundation-and-IASB.aspx>. 
Kvaal, E., and Nobes, C. 2010. International differences in IFRS policy choice: a research note. 
Accounting and Business Research 40 (2): 173-187. 
Lang, M.H., Maffett, M.G., and Owens, E.L. 2010. Earnings comovement and accounting 
comparability: The effects of mandatory IFRS adoption. Available at SSRN. 
Murphy, A. B. 1999. Firm characteristics of Swiss companies that utilize international accounting 
standards. The International Journal of Accounting 34: 121-131. 
Sengupta, P. 1998. Corporate Disclosure Quality and the Cost of Debt. The Accounting Review 73 
(4): 459-474. 
34 
 
Shin, H-H., and Kim, Y.H. 2002. Agency costs and efficiency of business capital investment: 
evidence from quarterly capital expenditures. Journal of Corporate Finance 8: 139-158. 
Shroff, N., Verdi, R.S., and Yu, G. 2014. Information Environment and the Investment Decisions 
of Multinational Corporations. The Accounting Review 89 (20): 759-790. 
Stein, J.C. 1997. Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources. Journal 
of Finance 52 (1): 111-133. 
Tarca, A. 2004. International convergence of accounting practices: Choosing between IAS and US 
GAAP. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting 15: 60-91. 
Wu, J.S., and Zhang, I. 2010. Accounting Integration and Comparability: Evidence from 
Relative Performance Evaluation Around IFRS Adoption. Available at SSRN. 
Wu, J.S., and Zhang, I.X. 2009. The voluntary adoption of internationally recognized accounting 
standards and firm internal performance evaluation. The Accounting Review; 84: 1281-1309. 
35 
 
TABLE 1 
 Descriptive Statistics 
  
IFRS years 
 
Non-IFRS years 
 p-value 
  
N mean median st.dev. 
 
N mean median st.dev. 
 
Subsidiary data 
           
 
Assets 
 
 3,506  10.0325 10.0186 2.7621 
 
56,609  9.7693 9.7336 2.5249 
 
0.00*** 
Profit 
 
 3,506  -0.0110 0.0217 0.3332 
 
56,609  0.0118 0.0254 0.2936 
 
0.00*** 
Tang 
 
 3,506  0.1800 0.0214 0.2874 
 
56,609  0.1900 0.0336 0.2875 
 
0.02** 
Lev 
 
 3,506  0.5341 0.3465 0.8018 
 
56,609  0.4765 0.2832 0.7519 
 
0.00*** 
Age 
 
 3,506  17.89 11.00 19.61 
 
56,609  20.62 14.00 20.22 
 
0.00*** 
Big4 
 
 3,506  0.5488 1.0000 0.50 
 
56,609  0.5419 1.0000 0.4982 
 
0.43 
NewEquity 
 
 3,153  0.4329 0.0000 0.4956 
 
47,490  0.3846 0.0000 0.4865 
 
0.00*** 
NewDebt 
 
 3,153  0.3514 0.0000 0.4775 
 
47,490  0.3146 0.0000 0.4644 
 
0.00*** 
ContInd 
 
 3,506  0.0017 0.0000 0.0413 
 
56,609  0.0187 0.0000 0.1353 
 
0.00*** 
ContFin 
 
 3,506  0.2670 0.0000 0.4424 
 
56,609  0.1568 0.0000 0.3636 
 
0.00*** 
ContFund 
 
 3,506  0.0248 0.0000 0.1556 
 
56,609  0.0253 0.0000 0.1571 
 
0.85 
ContNonFin 
 
 3,506  0.4920 0.0000 0.5000 
 
56,609  0.4781 0.0000 0.4995 
 
0.11 
             
Parent data 
            
GRPIFRS 
 
 1,447  0.4630 0.0000 0.4988 
 
20,032  0.2159 0.0000 0.4115 
 
0.00*** 
GRPUK 
 
 1,447  0.8604 1.0000 0.3467 
 
20,032  0.8414 1.0000 0.3654 
 
0.06* 
GRPSameInd 
 
 1,447  0.4423 0.0000 0.4968 
 
20,032  0.4185 0.0000 0.4933 
 
0.08* 
GRPSameName 
 
 1,447  0.1755 0.0000 0.3806 
 
20,032  0.1266 0.0000 0.3325 
 
0.00*** 
GRPAge 
 
1,447  29.9081 18.0000 30.1993 
 
20,032  28.7762 17.0000 30.7246 
 
0.09* 
GRPComplex 
 
1,447  0.5563 1.0000 0.4970 
 
20,032  0.4649 0.0000 0.4988 
 
0.00*** 
GRPAssets 
 
1,447  12.5135 12.6073 2.7385 
 
20,032  12.2067 12.0963 2.7298 
 
0.00*** 
GRPProfit 
 
1,447  -0.0168 0.0139 0.2243 
 
20,032  0.0129 0.0204 0.1713 
 
0.00*** 
GRBTang 
 
1,447  0.2851 0.1153 0.3345 
 
20,032  0.3976 0.3516 0.3466 
 
0.00*** 
GRPLev 
 
1,447  0.4367 0.3330 0.4160 
 
20,032  0.3813 0.2722 0.3930 
 
0.00*** 
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GRPRestEq 
 
 
1,447  
 
0.4464 
 
0.0000 
 
0.4973 
 
 
20,032  
 
0.4149 
 
0.0000 
 
0.4927 
 
 
0.02** 
GRPRestDebt 
 
1,447  0.3925 0.0000 0.4885 
 
20,032  0.3111 0.0000 0.4629 
 
0.00*** 
GRPRestAcq 
 
1,447  0.1866 0.0000 0.3897 
 
20,032  0.1681 0.0000 0.3739 
 
0.07* 
GRPRestVend 
 
1,447  0.1016 0.0000 0.3022 
 
20,032  0.1240 0.0000 0.3295 
 
0.01** 
GRPRestTarg   1,447  0.0574 0.0000 0.2326   20,032  0.0588 0.0000 0.2352   0.83 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for our treatment and control samples. Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in year t-
1; Profit  is the ratio of operating income over total assets at t-1; Tang is total fixed assets over total assets at t-1; Lev is the ratio of 
total, long- and short-term, debt over total assets for firm i in year t-1; Age is the number of years from the foundation of the 
company to the beginning of the fiscal year; and Big4  is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the financial statements of 
the firm in year t-1 were audited by a Big4 audit firm; NewEquity
 
is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the firm has increased 
its equity by more than 10% in the next year; NewDebt  is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the firm has increased its debt by 
more than 10% in the next year; ContInd, ContFin, ContFund, ContNonFin are all binary variables taking the value of 1 if the firm 
is controlled by a group of individuals, a financial firm excluding funds, a fund, and a non-financial firm respectively; GRPIFRS is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the group’s consolidated financial statements are prepared under IFRS.; GRPUK is a 
dummy variable taking the value of one if the parent firm of i is also based in the UK; GRPInd is a dummy variable taking the value 
of one if the subsidiary and the parent company belong to the same industry as captured by the two digit NAICS 2012 code; 
GRPName is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the subsidiary is named after the parent firm; GRPAge is the number of 
years from the foundation of the parent firm to the beginning of the fiscal year; GRPCompex is a dummy variable taking the value of 
one if the group has more than the mean number of subsidiaries; GRPAssets is the natural logarithm of the group’s total assets in 
year t-1; GRPProfit is the ratio of the group’s operating income over the group’s total assets at t-1; GRPTang is the group’s total 
fixed assets over the group’s total assets at t-1; GRPLev is the ratio of the group’s total, long- and short-term, debt over the group’s 
total assets in year t-1; GRPRestEq is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the group has increased in equity by more than 10% 
or entered and IPO within the 24 months following the IFRS adoption by the subsidiary; GRPRestDebt is a binary variable taking 
the value of 1 if the group has increased in debt by more than 10% within the 24 months following the IFRS adoption by the 
subsidiary; GRPRestAcq is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the group has sold some of its subsidiaries within the 24 months 
following the IFRS adoption by the subsidiary ; GRPRestVend is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the group has acquired 
new subsidiaries within the 24 months following the IFRS adoption by the subsidiary; GRPRestTarg is a binary variable taking the 
value of 1 if the group has been taken over within the 24 months following the IFRS adoption by the subsidiary. 
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TABLE 2   
Group geographic breakdown 
Geographic area No of firms No of 
observations 
Parent 
IFRS years 
United Kingdom 4,320 18,099 3,490 
Other commonwealth 78 262 171 
European Union 614 2,283 1,148 
Other European 60 271 132 
United States 75 196 0 
Rest of America & Carribean 11 32 23 
Africa 1 5 2 
Asia 86 324 24 
Middle East 4 7 5 
Total 5,249 21,479 4,995 
 
This table presents the breakdown of groups by geographical area, based on the location of 
the headquarters of the parent firm. 
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TABLE 3  
Fiscal year breakdown 
Panel A: Total sample 
  
Fiscal year 
Firm level 
incentives 
regressions 
Group level 
incentives 
regressions 
2005 7,208 1,368 
2006 6,639 1,521 
2007 8,166 1,587 
2008 8,482 2,857 
2009 8,226 3,794 
2010 7,714 3,677 
2011 7,228 3,481 
2012 6,452 3,194 
Total 60,115 21,479 
   
Panel B: IFRS sample 
  
Fiscal year 
Firm level 
incentives 
regressions 
Group level 
incentives 
regressions 
2005 1,243 318 
2006 531 204 
2007 293 100 
2008 303 136 
2009 333 200 
2010 313 213 
2011 360 212 
2012 130 64 
Total 3,506 1,447 
 
This table presents the breakdown of the total sample (Panel A) and 
the IFRS sample (Panel B) by fiscal year. 
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TABLE 4  
IFRS adoption determinants - Firm level incentives 
  
Multi-period model 
 
Single-period model 
Assets 
 
0.0372*** 
 
0.0229** 
 
0.9301*** 
 
0.8139*** 
 
0.9301*** 
 
0.8333*** 
  
(0.0087) 
 
(0.0091) 
 
(0.1656) 
 
(0.1949) 
 
(0.1667) 
 
(0.1971) 
Profit 
 
-0.2301*** 
 
-0.2700*** 
 
-0.2308*** 
 
-0.2714*** 
 
-0.1987*** 
 
-0.2288*** 
  
(0.0655) 
 
(0.0688) 
 
(0.0723) 
 
(0.0783) 
 
(0.0736) 
 
(0.0800) 
Tang 
 
-0.1088 
 
-0.1235 
 
-0.2780*** 
 
-0.3661*** 
 
-0.1520* 
 
-0.2492*** 
  
(0.0714) 
 
(0.0758) 
 
(0.0771) 
 
(0.0832) 
 
(0.0784) 
 
(0.0848) 
Lev 
 
0.0653*** 
 
0.0766*** 
 
0.0100*** 
 
0.1258*** 
 
0.0609** 
 
0.0874*** 
  
(0.0248) 
 
(0.0255) 
 
(0.0298) 
 
(0.0325) 
 
(0.0309) 
 
(0.0336) 
Age 
 
-0.0062*** 
 
-0.0032*** 
 
-0.0024** 
 
-0.0023* 
 
-0.0034*** 
 
-0.0034*** 
  
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0012) 
 
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0012) 
 
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0012) 
Big4 
 
0.2396*** 
 
0.0918** 
 
0.4807*** 
 
0.3723*** 
 
0.3465*** 
 
0.2311*** 
  
(0.0428) 
 
(0.0451) 
 
(0.4807) 
 
(0.0488) 
 
(0.0460) 
 
(0.0504) 
NewEquity 
   
0.1387*** 
   
0.1184*** 
   
0.1152*** 
    
(0.0385) 
   
(0.0435) 
   
(0.0443) 
NewDebt 
   
0.1158*** 
   
0.1649*** 
   
0.1540*** 
    
(0.0396) 
   
(0.0454) 
   
(0.0463) 
ContInd 
         
-1.7289*** 
 
-1.9435*** 
          
(0.4199) 
 
(0.4588) 
ContFin 
         
1.0814*** 
 
1.0695*** 
          
(0.0642) 
 
(0.0700) 
ContFund 
         
0.4400*** 
 
0.4894*** 
          
(0.1335) 
 
(0.1410) 
ContNonFin 
         
0.5683*** 
 
0.5595*** 
          
(0.0522) 
 
(0.0572) 
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Industry f.e. 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
no 
 
no 
 
no 
 
No 
Time f.e. 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
no 
 
no 
 
no 
 
No 
Matching   No   No   yes   yes   yes   yes 
N 
 
60,115 
 
50,643 
 
14,024 
 
11,581 
 
14,024 
 
11,581 
IFRS adopters 
 
3,506 
 
3,153 
 
3,506 
 
3,139 
 
3,506 
 
3,139 
chi-sq   23,404   20,522   225   179   581   484 
 
This table present logistic regression results from our analysis of firm level determinants of IFRS adoption. The dependent variable is a binary one 
taking the value of 1 if the firm has adopted IFRS and zero otherwise; Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in year t-1; Profit  is the ratio of 
operating income over total assets at t-1; Tang is total fixed assets over total assets at t-1; Lev is the ratio of total, long- and short-term, debt over total 
assets for firm i in year t-1; Age is the number of years from the foundation of the company to the beginning of the fiscal year; and Big4 is a 
dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the financial statements of the firm in year t-1 were audited by a Big4 audit firm; NewEquity
 
is a binary 
variable taking the value of 1 if the firm has increased its equity by more than 10% in the next year; NewDebt is a binary variable taking the value of 
1 if the firm has increased its debt by more than 10% in the next year; ContInd, ContFin, ContFund, ContNonFin are all binary variables taking the 
value of 1 if the firm is controlled by a group of individuals, a financial firm excluding funds, a fund, and a non-financial firm respectively. 
 
  
TABLE 5  
IFRS adoption determinants - Group level incentives 
Panel A: Group level incentives     
  
Financing 
Restructuring 
 
Portfolio 
Restructuring 
 
Restructuring 
All 
GRPRestEq 
 
0.0586 
   
0.0539 
  
(0.0590) 
   
(0.0594) 
GRPRestDebt 
 
0.2709*** 
   
0.2663*** 
  
(0.0605) 
   
(0.0606) 
GRPRestAcq 
   
-0.2990*** 
 
-0.3531*** 
    
(0.0917) 
 
(0.0919) 
GRPRestVend 
   
-0.8480*** 
 
-0.8141*** 
    
(0.1150) 
 
(0.1150) 
GRPRestTarg 
   
-0.6247*** 
 
-0.6079*** 
    
(0.1324) 
 
(0.1320) 
GRPIFRS 
 
1.8825*** 
 
2.1194*** 
 
2.1369*** 
  
(0.0784) 
 
(0.0823) 
 
(0.0827) 
GRPUK 
 
-0.1353 
 
-0.2204** 
 
-0.2431** 
  
(0.1015) 
 
(0.1022) 
 
(0.1026) 
GRPInd 
 
0.1481** 
 
0.1202* 
 
0.1144* 
  
(0.0691) 
 
(0.0694) 
 
(0.0694) 
GRPName 
 
0.0823 
 
0.1971** 
 
0.1910** 
  
(0.0939) 
 
(0.0943) 
 
(0.0945) 
GRPAge 
 
-0.0028*** 
 
-0.0025** 
 
-0.0027** 
  
(0.0010) 
 
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0011) 
GRPComplex 
 
0.1508** 
 
0.2164*** 
 
0.1933*** 
  
(0.0760) 
 
(0.0745) 
 
(0.0749) 
GRPTotalAssets 
 
-0.0150 
 
0.0109 
 
0.0097 
  
(0.0151) 
 
(0.0153) 
 
(0.0155) 
GRPProfitability 
 
-0.9827*** 
 
-0.9867*** 
 
-1.0212*** 
  
(0.1481) 
 
(0.1500) 
 
(0.1502) 
GRPTangibility 
 
-0.9758*** 
 
-1.0219*** 
 
-0.9981*** 
  
(0.1074) 
 
(0.1061) 
 
(0.1060) 
GRPLeverage 
 
0.4324*** 
 
0.3660*** 
 
0.3669*** 
  
(0.0708) 
 
(0.0715) 
 
(0.0718) 
       
Industry f.e. 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
GRPIndustry f.e. 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
Time f.e. 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
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N 
 
21,479 
 
21,479 
 
21,479 
IFRS adopters 
 
1,447 
 
1,447 
 
1,447 
chi-sq   7,722   7,620   7,592 
 
Panel B: Group and subsidiary level incentives   
  
Financing 
Restructuring 
 
Portfolio 
Restructuring 
 
Restructuring 
All 
GRPRestEq 
 
0.0314 
   
0.0286 
  
(0.0590) 
   
(0.0595) 
GRPRestDebt 
 
0.2759*** 
   
0.2797*** 
  
(0.0601) 
   
(0.0603) 
GRPRestAcq 
   
-0.3190*** 
 
-0.3712*** 
    
(0.0909) 
 
(0.0913) 
GRPRestVend 
   
-0.8224*** 
 
-0.7916*** 
    
(0.1130) 
 
(0.1130) 
GRPRestTarg 
   
-0.6045*** 
 
-0.5917*** 
    
(0.1315) 
 
(0.1311) 
RelSize 
 
0.0060*** 
 
0.0052*** 
 
0.0054*** 
  
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0011) 
Profitability 
 
-0.1743* 
 
-0.1626* 
 
-0.1697* 
  
(0.1006) 
 
(0.0982) 
 
(0.0985) 
Tangibility 
 
0.0100 
 
-0.0078 
 
-0.0056 
  
(0.1101) 
 
(0.1101) 
 
(0.1103) 
Leverage 
 
0.0004 
 
-0.0048 
 
-0.0058 
  
(0.0390) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.0386) 
Age 
 
-0.0121*** 
 
-0.0114*** 
 
-0.0113*** 
  
(0.0019) 
 
(0.0019) 
 
(0.0019) 
Big4 
 
-0.0391 
 
-0.0240 
 
-0.0313 
  
(0.0659) 
 
(0.0661) 
 
(0.0660) 
       
Other parent controls 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
Industry f.e. 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
GRPIndustry f.e. 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
Time f.e. 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
    
  
  
  
  
  
N 
 
21,479 
 
21,479 
 
21,479 
IFRS adopters 
 
1,447 
 
1,447 
 
1,447 
chi-sq   8,031   7,956   7,910 
 
This table present logistic regression results from our analysis of group level determinants 
of IFRS adoption. In Panel A we control only for group level incentives; while in Panel B 
we control for both group and subsidiary incentives. The dependent variable is a binary one 
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taking the value of 1 if the subsidiary firm has adopted IFRS and zero otherwise; 
GRPRestEq is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the group has increased in equity by 
more than 10% or entered and IPO within the 24 months following the IFRS adoption by 
the subsidiary; GRPRestDebt is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the group has 
increased in debt by more than 10% within the 24 months following the IFRS adoption by 
the subsidiary; GRPRestAcq is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the group has sold 
some of its subsidiaries within the 24 months following the IFRS adoption by the subsidiary 
; GRPRestVend is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the group has acquired new 
subsidiaries within the 24 months following the IFRS adoption by the subsidiary; 
GRPRestTarg is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the group has been taken over 
within the 24 months following the IFRS adoption by the subsidiary; GRPIFRS is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the group’s consolidated financial statements are prepared 
under IFRS; GRPUK is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the parent firm of i is 
also based in the UK; GRPInd is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the subsidiary 
and the parent company belong to the same industry as captured by the two digit NAICS 
2012 code; GRPName is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the subsidiary is 
named after the parent firm; GRPAge is the number of years from the foundation of the 
parent firm to the beginning of the fiscal year; GRPCompex is a dummy variable taking the 
value of one if the group has more than the mean number of subsidiaries; GRPAssets is the 
natural logarithm of the group’s total assets in year t-1; GRPProfit is the ratio of the group’s 
operating income over the group’s total assets at t-1; GRPTang is the group’s total fixed 
assets over the group’s total assets at t-1; GRPLev is the ratio of the group’s total, long- and 
short-term, debt over the group’s total assets in year t-1; RelSize is the ratio of the 
subsidiary’s total assets to group’s total assets at t-1; Tang is total fixed assets over total 
assets at t-1; Lev is the ratio of total, long- and short-term, debt over total assets for firm i in 
year t-1; Age is the number of years from the foundation of the company to the beginning of 
the fiscal year; and Big4  is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the financial 
statements of the firm in year t-1 were audited by a Big4 audit firm 
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TABLE 6  
IFRS adoption and firm level investment 
Panel A: Descriptives   
   
  N 
 
mean 
 
median 
 
st.dev. 
AbInv (signed)  85,090 
 
-0.0033 
 
-0.0184 
 
0.0907 
AbInv (abs)  85,090 
 
0.0501 
 
0.0270 
 
0.0767 
Assets  85,090  9.194  9.187 
 
2.209 
Profit  85,090  0.059  0.050 
 
0.228 
Tang  85,090  0.303  0.179 
 
0.307 
Lev  85,090  0.354  0.208 
 
0.466 
Age  85,090  20.92  15.00 
 
19.34 
Big4  85,090  0.441  0.000 
 
0.496 
CashLiq  85,090  0.181  0.087 
 
0.222 
IFRS  85,090  0.090  0.000 
 
0.286 
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Panel B: Regression results   
   
  subsidiaries  stand-alone 
  
underivetment 
 
overinvestment 
 
underivetment 
 
Overinvestment 
IFRS 
 
-0.0054*** 
 
-0.0000 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.0029 
 
 
(0.0020) 
 
(0.0113) 
 
(0.0045) 
 
(0.0201) 
TotalAssets 
 
0.0077*** 
 
-0.1199*** 
 
0.0065*** 
 
-0.1587*** 
  
(0.0007) 
 
(0.0047) 
 
(0.0013) 
 
(0.0068) 
Profitability 
 
0.0045*** 
 
0.0240*** 
 
0.0032 
 
0.0193 
  
(0.0016) 
 
(0.0095) 
 
(0.0027) 
 
(0.0146) 
Tangibility 
 
0.0589*** 
 
-0.1710*** 
 
0.0523*** 
 
-0.2618*** 
  
(0.0028) 
 
(0.0161) 
 
(0.0051) 
 
(0.0228) 
Leverage 
 
-0.0022* 
 
-0.0096 
 
0.0038 
 
-0.0392*** 
  
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0066) 
 
(0.0024) 
 
(0.0116) 
Age 
 
-0.0024*** 
 
0.0060*** 
 
-0.0028*** 
 
0.0049*** 
  
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0003) 
 
(0.0032) 
Big4 
 
-0.0013 
 
0.0097 
 
-0.0052 
 
-0.0081 
 
 
(0.0014) 
 
(0.0086) 
 
(0.0036) 
 
(0.0151) 
CashLiquidity 
 
0.0004 
 
0.0279 
 
0.0004 
 
0.0546** 
 
 
(0.0023) 
 
(0.0173) 
 
(0.0038) 
 
(0.0620) 
  
                
N 
 
35,201 
 
12,090 
 
27,242 
 
10,557 
IFRS adopters 
 
4,451 
 
1,556 
 
1,214 
 
430 
R-sq 
  0.04   0.12   0.02   0.16 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics (Panel A) and OLS regression results (Panel B) from our analysis of IFRS 
adoption effect on firm level investment efficiency. The dependent variable (AbInv)  is the absolute of the residual of 
the following regression estimated separately for each two digit UK SIC code: 
tii1ti,ti1ti,titi yearRevGrNegRevGrNegInvest ,,321,10, εαααα ++×+++= ∑−−−  
IFRS is a binary one taking the value of 1 if the subsidiary firm has adopted IFRS at year t; Assets is the natural 
logarithm of total assets in year t-1; Profit is the ratio of operating income over total assets at t-1; Tang is total fixed 
assets over total assets at t-1; Lev is the ratio of total, long- and short-term, debt over total assets for firm i in year t-1; 
Age is the number of years from the foundation of the company to the beginning of the fiscal year; and Big4 is a 
dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the financial statements of the firm in year t-1 were audited by a Big4 
audit firm; CashLiq
 
is the ratio of cash and cash equivalent assets over the total assets at t-1. 
 
 
 
 
